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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
HOWARD LLOYD MILES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981669 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: 
Whether Officer Collins acted in bad faith in disposing of 
blood samples after being informed that other evidentiary samples 
from the scene of the crime could not be collected and after 
being directed by the lab technician to provide the samples to 
the State Crime Lab for testing, among other things. 
Standard of Review: 
[T] he determination of whether specific police conduct rises 
to the level of bad faith is a question of law, reviewed 
under a correctness standard. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 936-37 (Utah 1994) . However, because the determination 
of bad faith turns on "vthe quintessential factual question 
of intent,'» [U. S. v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 909 (10th Cir. 
1994)] (citation omitted); [U.S. v. McKie, 951 P.2d 399, 403 
(D.C. Cir. 1991)], the bad-faith legal standard "is one that 
conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts." Pena, 869 
P.2d at 93 9. As in Pena, a case involving a constitutional 
question dependent on application of a legal standard to a 
given set of facts, it is impossible for us to precisely 
define the scope of that discretion other than to say that 
"we would not anticipate a close, de novo review. On the 
other hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary to 
assure that the purposes of the [bad-faith] requirement are 
served." Id. Accordingly we apply an abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review. 
State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324 (Utah App. 1998); see also 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Utah 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue on appeal was preserved in the record ("R.") at 
100; 102-110; 151:301-02, 315; 152. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions will be 
determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
On December 18, 1997, the state charged Howard Lloyd Miles 
("Miles") with burglary, a third degree felony offense in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and criminal mischief, 
a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 
(Supp. 1997). (R. 2-4.) After the first day of trial in this 
matter, Miles made a motion to dismiss the charges based on the 
state's destruction of evidence. (R. 102-110.) The trial court 
denied the motion, as set forth in the Memorandum Decision 
attached hereto as Addendum B, and the state-prepared Findings 
and Conclusions attached hereto as Addendum C. (See R. 116-130.) 
2 
The jury found Miles guilty of both offenses as charged (R. 
52; 90-91), and Miles was sentenced to serve three months in jail 
followed by probation. (R. 112-15.) A copy of the judgment and 
sentencing order is attached hereto as Addendum D. Miles hereby 
appeals from the final judgment; he is challenging the trial 
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Miles was charged with burglary, a third degree felony 
offense, and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor for 
allegedly breaking into an Einstein Bagels restaurant in December 
1997. (R. 2-4.) During the trial, the state designated Officer 
Scott Collins as the state's representative (R. 150:105), and 
presented the following evidence. 
Restaurant manager Eric Heaston testified that he was 
notified of a break-in at the restaurant at 4:00 a.m. on December 
10, 1997. When he arrived at the restaurant he observed that the 
double-pane glass in the drive-through window was shattered, and 
there was "blood all over the place from -- probably from the 
[broken] glass." (R. 150:121, 123, 124, 129.) According to 
Heaston, there was a particularly bloody area inside the 
restaurant (R. 150:131), and there were bloody handprints inside 
a closet that was accessible only from the outside of the 
building. (R. 150:133-34.) 
Nothing was taken from the bagel shop. (R. 150:125.) 
Restaurant employees began cleaning the blood smears at 6:00 a.m. 
on the morning of the incident. (R. 150:141.) 
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Steven Winberg was across the street from the restaurant, in 
the bed of his truck, loading a Salter on the morning of December 
10th. (R. 150:144-45.) He testified that he observed a person 
in a knit ski cap walking in the area, and at one point, as the 
person walked by his truck, he had his head down and they "kind 
of looked at each other [at] the same time," and they exchanged 
words. (R. 150:146-47, 161, 164, 177.) Thereafter, the person 
crossed the highway to a dark parking lot, and Winberg either got 
into his truck (R. 150:150) or started walking to follow the 
person. (R. 150:151.) From a distance "across the highway" (R. 
150:151), Winberg observed the person punch out the glass in the 
drive-through window of the restaurant, and crawl into the 
building through the window. (R. 150:149-153.) Winberg tried 
several times to contact police and "finally got a hold of them 
and told them what was going on and they just told [him] to hang 
tight." (R. 150:153, 186.) 
Winberg admitted that "because of the darkness and not good 
light," all he could see at that point "was a figure." "I 
couldn't see anything besides that. All I seen was somebody was 
there." (R. 150:154; see also 150:169.) According to Winberg, 
there were no street lights in the area of the bagel shop, and he 
could not recall what the lighting was like in the restaurant 
parking lot. (R. 150:184.) Winberg testified that as he observed 
the incident from across the street, he also was attempting to 
get the attention of another worker "to come down and pick [him] 
up." (R. 150:154.) 
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Winberg observed the person in the cap exit the building 
through a back door (R. 150:155-56), and walk south. Thereafter, 
Miles was arrested. (R. 150:157-58.) 
Winberg testified that he "never lost sight [of the person 
in the cap] the whole time." (R. 150:158.) He also testified 
that during the entire incident he was on the telephone, he was 
looking for the other worker to pick him up, and he walked around 
the truck to climb into it. (R. 150:165-68.) 
Winberg identified Miles as the person in the cap. (R. 
150:159-162.) Miles was not wearing a cap. (R. 150:161-62, 167, 
192-93, 200-01.) Winberg's testimony required the jury to 
resolve whether Winberg clearly identified Miles as the person 
who broke into the restaurant. (See. R. 82-84 (eyewitness 
instruction); 151:316.) 
The state's next witness, Starla Roque, was delivering 
papers at the restaurant on December 10th. She testified that 
while she sat in her car she observed a man exit the building at 
4:00 in the morning, and then he disappeared around the side of 
the building. She stated that she later saw Miles in police 
custody. (R. 150:216.) Roque testified that she observed the 
man, who exited the restaurant, five feet from her car. She 
identified the man as Miles. (R. 150:217, 227.) 
On cross-examination, Roque admitted that prior to trial she 
did not recall what the man looked like; she did not recall 
whether he was wearing a cap, whether he had facial hair, or 
whether his hair was straight or curly, but remembered only that 
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he had blond hair and dark clothes. (R. 150:221.) Roque also 
admitted that before she testified, the prosecutor sought to 
enhance her identification of Miles with a picture of him. (R. 
150:223-24.) Roquefs testimony required the jury to resolve 
whether Roque clearly identified the person who was leaving the 
restaurant as Miles. (See R. 82-84 (eyewitness instruction); see 
also 151:316.) 
Deputy Allen Morrical testified that he stopped Miles while 
Miles was walking down the street a short distance from the bagel 
restaurant, and arrested him. (R. 150:232.) Morrical testified 
that he observed several small cuts on Miles' hands. (R. 150:234-
35.) Morrical did not find a cap at the arrest scene or at the 
restaurant. (R. 150:239-40; see also 150:135.) 
Officer Collins testified that he responded to the call from 
dispatch and collected witness statements. (R. 150:244-46.) He 
observed small, fresh abrasions on Miles' knuckles (R. 150:246-
47), and significant areas of blood in the restaurant. (R. 
150:250-51.) He also testified that Miles' hands were not 
bleeding, and did not require medical attention. (R. 150:247-48.) 
Collins testified that he made an attempt to collect blood 
samples, but was unable to successfully gather a sample that 
would be of any evidentiary value. (R. 150:253-54, 262-63.) 
Thus, he had photographs taken of areas where fresh blood was 
smeared or dropped. (R. 150:254.) Collins also testified that he 
requested an evidence technician to lift fingerprints from the 
scene, but was told at the time that the technician could not 
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successfully lift latent prints. (R. 150:255.) Collins 
requested that an officer take photographs of a footprint, but 
made no attempt to compare it to Miles' footprint. (R. 150:256.) 
On the second day of trial, evidence technician John Bell 
testified outside the presence of the jury that he collected 
blood samples from the scene on two swatches, properly preserved 
the swatches, and "turned everything over to Deputy Collins." 
(R. 151:292-93, 296; see also 151:324-25.) Bell informed Collins 
that he did not know if the samples would be sufficient for 
testing and Collins would "have to turn it over to the State 
Crime Lab, because we don't do that kind of work." (R. 151:2 93.) 
Bell also testified that he "left that decision up to 
Detective Collins as to whether or not [the samples] would be 
submitted to the Crime Lab." (R. 151:294; see also 151:327.) 
Bell did not know if the samples still existed since he left them 
in Collins' care. (R. 151:295.) Also, he could not say if a 
sample of the size he collected at the restaurant could be tested 
by the Crime Lab. (R. 151:295.) Since Collins was not in 
attendance at the trial on the second day, the prosecutor 
represented that apparently Collins "decided that he wasn't going 
to submit [the samples]. I mean, that's a decision he has to 
live with as far as his investigation goes." (R. 151:307.) 
During the defense's case, Miles' mother testified that 
Miles is right-handed, and that when he was released from jail 
she observed he had only a small cut on his left hand on his 
pinky finger. (R. 151:334-35.) 
7 
Inasmuch as counsel for the defense was unaware until after 
Collins testified on the first day of trial that blood samples 
were taken from the scene, counsel made a motion in open court to 
continue the matter (R. 151:287-88, 302), and subsequently moved 
to dismiss the case based on the state's wrongful destruction of 
the blood samples. (R. 100-110.) After the trial, the court 
denied the motion in a memorandum decision, wherein the court 
stated that there was no evidence of bad faith on Collins' part 
in destroying the samples. (R. 124.) Miles asserts on appeal 
that the trial court erred in its ruling. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
government violates a criminal defendant's due process rights 
when it destroys evidence that is potentially useful. Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). To establish a violation 
under Youngblood, defendant must show that the government acted 
in bad faith. In this case, Collins destroyed blood samples that 
Bell collected from the scene of the crime. The samples were 
destroyed before tests could be conducted on them. Miles 
maintains that the samples would have exonerated him of the 
charged offenses. Thus, he made a motion in the trial court to 
continue the trial or dismiss the charges on the grounds that 
Collins destroyed the samples in bad faith. 
The trial court denied Miles' motion and found that Collins 
and Bell apparently had a miscommunication with respect to 
whether the samples could be tested. According to the trial 
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court, Collins did not act in bad faith. 
The trial court's findings are incorrect. The record 
reflects that Collins misrepresented facts at trial concerning 
collection of the blood samples, the state improperly withheld 
evidence from the defense concerning the samples, Collins de-
stroyed the samples before testing and apparently in violation of 
normal practices, and Collins reasonably knew of the evidentiary 
value of the samples at the time that he destroyed them. Collins 
acted in bad faith. The constitutional violation prejudiced 
Miles, requiring reversal of this matter for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THAT COLLINS ACTED IN BAD FAITH WHEN HE 
DESTROYED THE BLOOD SAMPLES. 
A. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PROHIBITS THE PROSECUTION TEAM 
FROM DESTROYING CERTAIN EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE CASE. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution requires the prosecution team to disclose 
all evidence to the criminal defendant that is material either to 
guilt or punishment.1 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 
(1984) . In addition, that clause prohibits the state and 
officers investigating the case from destroying certain evidence 
prior to trial. 
The principles articulated by the United States Supreme 
1 Miles asserts that Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution requires the same disclosure. See also State v. 
Thomas, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1999) (recognizing that 
prosecution's open file policy requires complete disclosure of 
inculpatory and exculpatory information). Miles is not seeking a 
separate analysis under the state constitution. 
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Court in Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), 
concern the wrongful destruction of evidence. In Trombetta, the 
Court considered whether the prosecution was constitutionally 
required to preserve breath samples used to obtain intoxication 
test results that were provided to the defense during pre-trial 
discovery. The test results supported defendants' convictions. 
According to the Court, the constitutional duty to preserve 
evidence "must be limited to evidence that might be expected to 
play a significant role in the suspect's defense." Trombetta, 
467 U.S. at 488. "To meet this standard of constitutional 
materiality, [] evidence must both possess an exculpatory value 
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of 
such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain 
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 (cites omitted). 
In Trombetta, the Court determined that the state did not 
violate defendants' due process rights by destroying the breath 
samples. The Court ruled that (1) in light of the procedures 
used to obtain the test results, it was unlikely that preserved 
samples would have exculpated the defendants; (2) defendants were 
"perfectly capable of raising" issues concerning the validity of 
the testing process without the actual breath samples; and (3) 
the officers acted in good faith in destroying the samples, since 
destruction was in accordance with their normal practice. Id. at 
488-90; see also State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 516-17 (Utah App. 
1998) (recognizing Trombetta ruling); State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 
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101, 106 (Utah 1985) (defendant must show that evidence destroyed 
by prosecution was material to guilt or innocence for destruction 
to constitute a due process violation); State v. Stewart, 544 
P.2d 477, 479 (Utah 1975). 
Under the two-prong Trombetta test, the government violates 
a defendant's right to due process when: (1) it destroys 
evidence whose exculpatory significance is "apparent before" 
destruction; and (2) the defendant remains unable to "obtain 
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." 
U.S. v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489). 
In Youngblood, the Supreme Court extended the Trombetta 
analysis. The Court determined that if destroyed evidence was 
"potentially useful" -- that is, its exculpatory value had not 
yet been determined -- the defendant must show that the 
government acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence to 
establish a due process violation. See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 910. 
In Youngblood, the victim of a sexual assault was taken to 
the hospital where a physician used a "sexual assault kit" to 
collect evidence of the assault, including saliva, blood and hair 
samples. The physician did not examine the samples, but placed 
them in a secure refrigerator. Later, another officer examined 
the samples, determined an assault had occurred and placed the 
samples back in the refrigerator. Youngblood 488 U.S. at 52-54. 
Two months after the assault, the state tried to collect semen 
samples from the victim's clothing, but was unsuccessful. Id. 
During pre-trial discovery, "[t]he State disclosed relevant 
police reports to [defendant], which contained information about 
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the existence of the swab and the clothing, and the boy's 
examination at the hospital. The State provided [defendant's] 
expert with the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the 
police criminologist, and [defendant's] expert had access to the 
swab and to the clothing." Id. at 55. Notwithstanding the 
information made available to defendant, he maintained that the 
state violated his due process rights by failing to make timely 
efforts to collect "semen samples from the victim's body and 
clothing." Id. at 52. 
In considering the matter, the Supreme Court determined that 
the evidence supported that the officers' failure to refrigerate 
the clothing and to perform earlier tests on the semen samples 
constituted negligence. Further, " [n]one of this information was 
concealed from [defendant] at trial, and the evidence -- such as 
it was -- was made available to [defendant's] expert who declined 
to perform any tests on the samples." Id. at 58. 
The Court recognized that the unpreserved semen samples may 
have exonerated defendant. Id. at 56. However, because "no more 
can be said [of the evidence other] than that it could have been 
subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated 
the defendant," id. at 57, the Court ruled that defendant must 
show that the police acted in "bad faith" in failing to preserve 
the potentially useful evidence. Id. at 58. Because the 
officers in Younablood made full disclosure with respect to the 
evidence in their possession, and they provided the defendant 
with the opportunity to assess that information, defendant was 
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unable to show bad faith on the part of the officers for failing 
to preserve the samples. Id. 
After Youngblood, this Court considered the issue of police 
misconduct in destroying potentially useful evidence in State v. 
Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah App. 1998). In that case, this 
Court identified the defendant's burden as follows: 
Regarding cases when the state has failed "to preserve 
evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that 
it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which 
might have exonerated the defendant," [Youngblood, 488 U.S. 
at 57] , a defendant must show "bad faith on the part of the 
police," [id. at 58]. Bad faith requires that a defendant 
prove more than mere negligence; a defendant must show that 
"the police ... by their conduct indicate that the evidence 
could form a basis for exonerating the defendant." Id. 
Holden, 964 P.2d at 323. 
In Miles' case, the samples apparently were destroyed before 
their usefulness could be determined. Thus, the analysis set 
forth in Youngblood and Holden applies, as set forth below. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING BAD FAITH ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND THEY DISREGARD IMPORTANT EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING COLLINS' CONDUCT. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in 
this matter, the relevant finding concerning whether Collins' 
acted in good/bad faith in destroying the evidence reflected the 
following: "There was an apparent miscommunication between the 
officers as to the sufficiency of the blood samples." (R. 128; 
see also.)2 That finding is clearly erroneous. In addition, the 
2 The "findings" portion of the order contained four "findings of 
fact." The first and fourth findings do not relate to Collins' 
conduct. The first finding states, "The destroyed blood samples, 
at best, have only a mere possibility of being exculpatory in 
(continued...) 
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trial court disregarded evidence of bad faith, including the 
following: The record supports that (1) the state improperly 
withheld information during pre-trial discovery that officers 
collected blood samples from the crime scene; (2) Collins 
misrepresented facts about the blood samples when he testified, 
thereby avoiding cross-examination on the matter; (3) Collins 
destroyed the samples apparently in violation of normal 
practices; and (4) Collins' knew that the samples could be 
exculpatory at the time he destroyed them. Under Youngblood, the 
facts reflect bad faith. 
Specifically, on the second day of trial, defense counsel 
discovered that the state withheld police reports during pre-
trial discovery that would have disclosed that officers collected 
blood samples from the crime scene. (R. 151:287-88, 302-304, 310 
(court recognized that if the state had disclosed reports to 
defense counsel during pre-trial discovery, "she would have known 
when Deputy Collins was testifying that there was apparently a 
(...continued) 
nature." (R. 128.) The fourth finding recognizes that the blood 
samples had not yet been tested. Both findings 1 and 4 support 
application of the Youngblood analysis to this case. 
The second "finding" may be more appropriately characterized 
as a conclusion. It states: "There exists no evidence of bad 
faith on the part of Officer Collins." (Id.) "Bad faith" is the 
conclusion to the mixed question of law and fact; the conclusion 
must be based in the facts. See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 
191 (Utah 1986) (court "conclude[s]" as a "matter of law" that 
conduct constituted "bad faith"); see also Trulis v. Barton, 107 
F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that uncontroverted 
facts demonstrate "bad faith as a matter of law"). The conclusory 
determination of "bad faith" set forth in the findings is similar 
to "conclusions" 2 and 6, which concern "bad faith." (R. 12 9.) 
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sample taken").)3 The defense alerted the trial judge to the 
matter, and the prosecutor responded that he "thought" he had 
disclosed the reports although he could not confirm that fact. 
(R. 151:289; see note 3, herein supra.) The state's failure to 
disclose the report supports bad faith. 
In addition, Collins specifically left the impression from 
his trial testimony that no blood samples were collected, thereby 
effectively preventing the defense from examining him with 
3 On February 12, 1998, counsel for Miles requested discovery of 
"all physical evidence taken and all investigative analy[ses] 
done on any evidence in the above-entitled case." (R. 9-10.) 
Counsel also requested evidence relating to Miles' hands. (R. 
12.) On the second day of trial, counsel for the defense 
discovered that the state failed to disclose reports reflecting 
the fact that Bell collected blood samples at the crime scene. 
Counsel raised this issue to the trial court. (R. 151:287-88; 
152:4.) In response, the prosecutor, Ernie Jones, stated that he 
"thought" his office had provided the reports along with other 
papers to the defense, and even if he had not provided the 
reports, "what's the prejudice here?" (R. 151:289.) The judge 
declined to rule on whether the prosecutor failed in his duty to 
disclose the reports to the defense during pre-trial discovery. 
(See R. 151:290.) 
In State v. Thomas, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1999), the 
Utah Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the prosecution's 
duty to provide full disclosure in discovery. In that case, the 
state similarly believed it had provided a particular document to 
the defense in response to discovery requests, although no record 
of the disclosure existed in the file. The Utah Supreme Court 
declined to find that the disclosure had been made, absent 
something in the record supporting the state's position: "Despite 
the State's beliefs and its insistence to the contrary, we have 
no documentary evidence before us that indicates [defendant's] 
counsel - either past or present - ever received the [document]. 
We therefore find that the State acted improperly in not 
furnishing a copy of [the document] to [defendant's] subsequent 
counsel." Thomas, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. 
In this matter, there is no documentary evidence that the 
state disclosed the reports to the defense prior to trial. In 
accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Thomas, "the 
State acted improperly in not furnishing a copy of [the document] 
to [defendant's] subsequent counsel." Id. 
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respect to his unilateral decision to destroy the samples after 
he had been directed to submit them to the crime lab for testing. 
Collins1 testimony was as follows: 
[Prosecutor]: Let me ask you: Did you try to collect any of 
this blood, any of the physical evidence there at the scene? 
[Collins]: We did. 
[Prosecutor]: And were you able to do that at all? 
[Collins]: Not successfully where we felt it would have any 
evidentiary value. It was so cold outside and we took - I 
had called out an evidence tech to the scene for 
photographs, possible processing of any latent and any 
collection of any other evidence he deemed necessary. 
He had taken a napkin and wiped it along the ice - the 
blood-stained ice on the sill - and nothing came off. 
We went to the wall, tried to collect some of that; 
nothing came off. I - we - we pondered whether maybe we 
could scrape something off the wall and be able to get 
anything like that, and it was a consensus amongst all of us 
that were there that it probably wouldn't be worth any 
evidentiary value at that time. 
[Prosecutor]: So you're saying you attempted to try to 
collect some of this blood but -
[Collins]: Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) That's why we 
photographed it. 
[Prosecutor]: Let me ask you: Did the blood that you saw 
inside of Einsteins, did that appear to be fresh? 
[Collins]: It did. It appeared to be fresh insofar as there 
was no dust on it, there was no snow on it, it didn't appear 
to be iced over or any foreign particle or matter on top of 
it. 
(R. 150:254-55.) Collins also testified as follows: 
[Defense Counsel]: [I]t was your collective opinion that you 
couldn't take any blood samples from this scene? 
[Collins]: That's correct. 
[Defense Counsel]: So you weren't able to determine what 
blood type the blood was. 
[Collins]: Well, understand, it was not my attempt, 
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necessarily, to try to collect blood. That's what our 
evidence technician was for. It was his opinion that he 
articulated to me that he felt he couldn't successfully take 
a blood sample that the State Lab would be able to do 
anything with. 
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So, based on that opinion, there 
were no blood samples taken? 
[Collins]: There were no blood samples booked into evidence, 
that's correct. 
[Defense Counsel]: All right. So there's no way of knowing 
what blood type that blood was? 
[Collins]: Obviously, if we don't have it, we can't match 
it. 
[Defense Counsel]: And if you had it, I guess, you could 
have at least checked the blood type, right? 
[Collins]: If the district attorney ordered so and the State 
Lab was able to do it, then I suppose, yes, maybe that would 
be true. 
(R. 150:263-64.) Collins' testimony supports that no samples 
were taken. 
According to the record, he avoided the question as to 
whether samples were collected, by responding that no samples 
were "booked into evidence," and by representing that blood 
samples could not be taken from the scene. As an experienced law 
officer, Collins knew that his answers were misleading. In 
response to an additional question concerning whether there was 
any way of knowing the blood type without samples, Collins went 
one step further by affirmatively representing the "obvious" --
that without samples there is no way to match the blood type. 
The appropriate responses to the questions would have revealed 
that the samples were collected and that he destroyed them. 
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Collins never disclosed that information. Instead, he provided 
misleading testimony. 
"It is well settled that deliberate deception of a court and 
jurors by the presentation of known false evidence cannot be 
reconciled with the rudimentary demands of justice." Campbell v. 
Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Pvle v. Kansas, 317 
U.S. 213 (1942)) (emphasis added). "The same result obtains when 
the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to 
go uncorrected when it appears." Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)); see also Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 
687, 690 (Utah 1981) (allowing false impressions to go forward 
involves a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial 
process). Here, "the prosecution allowed a false impression to 
be created at trial." Campbell, 594 F.2d at 8. 
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that a law enforcement officer must be aware 
of the need for accuracy in making representations for the 
purpose of obtaining a warrant. An officer must also be aware of 
"the importance of absolute truthfulness in any statements made 
under oath." Id. In that case, an officer left false 
impressions when he made incorrect statements to a magistrate in 
support of obtaining a search warrant. The Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that where an officer provides knowingly false information 
under oath, "as a matter of law, he acted in bad faith." Id. 
In Younablood, the Supreme Court found no "bad faith" in the 
fact that the state made full disclosure with respect to relevant 
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police reports and collected samples, and made samples available 
to the defendant and his experts for testing. "None of this 
information was concealed from [defendant] at trial." 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. In Miles' case, Collins1 
misrepresentations and the state's failure to disclose reports 
relating to blood samples reflects bad faith. 
Further, the marshaled evidence, which includes Bell's 
testimony and Collins' testimony taken together, does not support 
"an apparent miscommunication," as set forth in the findings. 
(See R. 128; note 2, herein supra.) Rather, the fact that Collins 
misrepresented the matter at trial supports the determination 
that he understood Bell's directions, but made the unilateral 
decision to destroy the samples, then tried to hide that fact. 
That is all that can be said about the conflict in testimony. 
Collins' carefully structured answers to questions at trial left 
a knowingly false impression that no blood samples were 
collected. They do not reflect a "miscommunication." 
Next, the evidence supports that Collins destroyed the 
samples apparently in violation of normal practices. Bell 
testified that he directed Collins "to turn [the samples] over to 
the State Crime Lab" for testing, and that there may be enough 
for testing. (R. 151:293.) Specifically, Bell testified as 
follows: 
[Counsel for Defense]: So you did not tell Deputy Collins 
that there was no way that the State Crime Lab could test 
these samples; is that correct? 
[Bell]: I did not, no. 
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[Counsel for Defense]: Because that would be a call that the 
State Crime Lab would have to make; isn't that right? 
[Bell]: Yes. 
[Counsel for Defense] : And as far as you knew, there was a 
possibility that they could test that blood; isn't that 
right? 
[Bell]: There was a possibility. 
[Counsel for Defense]: And a decision as to whether or not 
to send that sample to the State Crime Lab was with Deputy 
Collins; isn't that correct? 
[Bell]: Yes. 
[Counsel for Defense]: It was not your decision. 
[Bell]: No, it was not. 
(R. 151:327-29.) The trial judge summarized the matter as 
follows: 
I don't know what to believe about Deputy Collins now. He's 
told us one thing and apparently this witness has a 
different recollection, that a sample was taken and the 
sample wasn't submitted. Now, is that something we're going 
to allow police officers to make the decision? 
If a competent technician collects a sample and says, 
"I don't know if this is going to be enough for the state 
lab to do it, but here it is," and the officer decides, 
"Well, I'm not going to do it," for whatever reason, I don't 
think that's a police officer's decision. 
(R. 151:307-08.) The prosecutor agreed: "Well, it may not be. And 
I think the defense can argue that to the jury." (R. 151:308.) 
In addition, Collins' testimony supports that his unilateral 
decision to destroy samples apparently was contrary to depart-
ment practices. Collins stated the following earlier at trial: 
[Defense Counsel]: And if you had [collected samples], I 
guess, you could have at least checked the blood type, 
right? 
[Collins]: If the district attorney ordered so and the State 




In Youngblood, the Court found that destroying evidence in 
accordance with normal practices supported a showing of good 
faith. In Miles' case, Collins' unilateral decision to destroy 
the samples was contrary to Bell's instructions, and to Collins' 
understanding as to how samples would be handled, where he 
testified that if he had samples, he would await the district 
attorney's orders and a determination from the State Lab as to 
whether testing could be accomplished. The record supports bad 
faith conduct on Collins' part in destroying the samples. 
Finally, with respect to the trial court's determination 
that "Collins did not have knowledge of the exculpatory value of 
the blood samples at the time he discarded them" (R. 12 9; see 
also 124), that is not supported by facts based in the record. 
Indeed, it is impossible to know from the record when Collins 
destroyed the samples since he never disclosed that fact. In the 
event he destroyed them after the defense served the discovery 
requests on the state, see note 3, supra, Collins was on notice 
that the samples could have exculpatory value for the defense. 
If Collins destroyed the samples at that time he acted in bad 
faith. See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911 (destruction of evidence was in 
bad faith where government destroyed evidence after it was 
specifically placed on notice that defense requested inspection 
of the information). 
In addition, at the time the blood samples were collected, 
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Collins was on notice that Bell was unable to collect any other 
evidentiary samples from the crime scene. (R. 150:264-68.) Thus, 
the only evidence consisted of eyewitness identifications. 
To the extent Collins believed blood tests would be 
cumulative evidence of guilt given the eyewitness identification 
testimony from Winberg and Roque, Collins also would have been 
aware that eyewitness identifications are fallible. He knew that 
in this case, the crime occurred at 4:00 a.m., Winberg observed 
the offense in the dark from across the highway, Winberg's des-
cription of what the actor was wearing did not match what Miles 
was wearing, and Roque would have observed the actor only briefly 
in the dark as he was exiting the building and turning his back 
to her. As an experienced officer, Collins would have realized 
that with respect to eyewitness identification, the "human 
perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and 
fallible." State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986). 
Anyone who stops to consider [eyewitness identification] 
will recognize that the process of perceiving events and 
remembering them is not as simple or as certain as turning 
on a camera and recording everything the camera sees on tape 
or film for later replay. 
Id. On the other hand, test results from blood samples would 
provide important information to both parties. Given the 
fallibility of eyewitness identification, Collins would have 
realized the importance of testing the blood samples and the 
possibility that the "evidence could form a basis for exonerating 
the defendant." Holden, 964 P.2d at 323. 
Instead, Collins destroyed the samples in violation of 
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department practices as he understood them. Thereafter, the 
state withheld information about the blood samples during pre-
trial discovery and prior to Collins' testimony, and Collins 
misrepresented the matter under oath on the witness stand. 
Collins' conduct supports that he understood "the evidence could 
form a basis for exonerating the defendant," when he destroyed 
the samples. 
The record supports that Collins acted in bad faith. His 
destruction of the samples before obtaining test results violated 
Miles' due process rights under Youngblood. 
C. MILES IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL FOR THE REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
Upon discovering that Collins destroyed the blood samples, 
the defense made a motion for a continuance or in the alternative 
for a dismissal of the matter. (R. 151:287-88, 302.) The trial 
court refused the continuance and asked the parties to submit 
memoranda of points and authority in support of their respective 
positions. (R. 151:313-15.) Since the papers were filed after the 
trial, the defense requested a dismissal of the matter. (R. 100-
110.) 
On appeal, this Court may order a new trial with directions 
that the prosecution's secondary evidence of blood at the scene 
be suppressed, or dismissal of the matter for the Youngblood 
violation. In considering appropriate remedies, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Court has stated the following: 
"[A]fter concluding that there has been a violation of 
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Youncrblood, the decision to either suppress the government's 
secondary evidence describing the destroyed material or to 
dismiss the indictment turns on the prejudice that resulted to 
the defendant at trial." U.S. v. Bohl. 25 F.3d 904, 914 (10th 
Cir. 1994) . In that regard, " [such] factors as the centrality of 
the evidence at trial the reliability of the secondary evidence, 
and the effect such destruction had on the defendant's ability to 
present a defense, must be considered in the calculus." Id. 
In this case, the state produced secondary evidence 
concerning blood at the crime scene and cuts on Miles' hands 
through the following witnesses: Heaston testified that blood was 
found throughout the restaurant at various locations (see R. 
150:121-29, 131-34); and Collins, Bell, and Morrical testified 
that they observed blood inside the restaurant, and small cuts 
with dried blood on Miles' hands. (See e.g. R. 150:234-35, 246-
47, 250-54; 151:292-93, 296, 324-25.) Miles maintains that the 
due process clause would require suppression of the testimony of 
those witnesses concerning the matter, as well as suppression of 
the related photographs. See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 914. 
Since the state's case also consisted of eyewitness 
identification testimony from Winberg and Roque, the analysis 
does not end here. 
Pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), a 
conviction tainted by constitutional error must be set aside 
unless the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.; 
see also State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah App. 1995) . 
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That analysis requires this Court to decide whether other 
credible evidence was before the jury and if it was, whether it 
was so compelling that this Court can conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same 
verdict without the objectionable evidence. See State v. 
Dahlauist, 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah App. 1997). 
"It is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence to 
support the conviction even if the [offensive evidence] is 
excised from the record. It is inconsequential that a retrial 
will most likely result in a conviction. "Beyond a reasonable 
doubt' requires the highest level of certainty known to our legal 
system in the resolution of a disputed factual matter." Id. 
If the remaining evidence is clouded with credibility 
issues, and/or it concerns problematic identification testimony, 
this Court "simply cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the error in admitting the [offensive evidence] was 
harmless." Id. at 868. 
In this matter, the trial judge recognized the possibility 
that the jury may not believe the eyewitness identification 
testimony, and that identification testimony required the jury to 
resolve credibility issues. (R. 151:311, 316.) "The Long 
instruction - Long in name as well as length - the Supreme Court 
mandates, which I, of course, will be giving in this case, may 
well suggest to the jury that they can't put much credibility in 
the testimony of an eyewitness." (R. 151: 316-17.) 
The jury instructions in this case directed jurors to 
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consider matters affecting Winberg's and Roque's observations, 
such as the lack of light available to the witnesses, the length 
of time each witness observed the actor, whether identification 
of the actor was a product of each witness' own memory, and the 
emotional and physical strains on each witness, including fatigue 
and whether the witness was experiencing stress. (See R. 82-84); 
see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-489 (Utah 1986) . Those 
factors and more affected Winberg's and Roque's testimony in this 
case. (See e.g. R. 150:154, 169 (observations were made at 4:00 
a.m.); 150:165-68 (Winberg was preoccupied and stressed); 
150:221-24 (Roque's identification testimony was enhanced by the 
prosecutor showing a photograph to her before she testified).) 
Thus, reliability concerns surrounded the identification 
testimony of the eyewitnesses in this case. 
Since the jurors were weighing evidence susceptible of 
differing interpretations and/or evidence presenting reliability 
concerns, see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-89 (Utah 1986) 
(eyewitness identification testimony should be considered with 
care given reliability concerns), there was a greater likelihood 
that the jurors were influenced by the offensive, secondary 
evidence concerning blood. " [T]here is a reasonable possibility 
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction." State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 537 (Utah App. 1997) 
(quoting Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d 1335, 1349 (5th Cir. 
1986) and quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963)). 
Thus, use of the offensive evidence was harmful, requiring 
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reversal of this matter for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Miles respectfully 
requests reversal of the convictions in this matter, and remand 
for further proceedings, as this Court may deem appropriate. 
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1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pomtment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
ADDENDUM B 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD LLOYD MILES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 971922700 
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on 
State's Destruction of Evidence. A hearing was held on this matter 
on September 18, 1998, at which time counsel for defendant and 
counsel for the State presented their respective positions. 
Following oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement 
to further consider the written submissions. Since having taken 
the defendant's Motion under advisement, the Court has had an 
opportunity to once again review the moving and responding legal 
Memoranda, and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On December 18, 1997, the defendant was charged by Information 
with burglary, a third degree felony, and criminal mischief, a 
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class B misdemeanor. Following a jury trial held August 10 and 11, 
1998, the defendant was found guilty on both charges. 
At the trial, the State presented circumstantial evidence and 
eye-witness testimony that connected the defendant to a burglary 
that occurred at an Einstein's Bagel restaurant on December 10, 
1997. During the course of the trial, Officer John Bell testified 
that he was called to the scene of the burglary to process it for 
fingerprints and to collect blood samples. Officer Bell testified 
that he was able to obtain two blood samples; one collected near a 
small ledge under the cash register and one collected near the 
outside window of the restaurant. According to Officer Bell's 
testimony, he placed the two "swatches" of blood in a container and 
turned them over to Officer Scott Collins. Officer Bell testified 
that he did not know whether there was a sufficient amount of the 
blood samples for the State Crime Lab to perform tests on them, but 
that he left the decision of whether to actually take the samples 
to the Lab up to Officer Collins. 
Officer Collins testified that Officer Bell communicated his 
opinion that there was an insufficient amount of blood collected 
for any tests to be performed by the State Crime Lab. According to 
Officer Collins, the consensus was that the blood samples could not 
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be analyzed and that they did not have any evidentiary value. For 
this reason, Officer Collins apparently made the decision not to 
prserve the samples. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In his Motion, the defendant argues that the State violated 
his due process right to access to material evidence when the 
police officers collected a blood sample from the scene of the 
crime and then discarded it. The State's position is that the 
blood samples were not constitutionally material and that even if 
they were, the defendant cannot present any evidence that the 
police acted in bad faith. 
The principle that the government is only required to preserve 
evidence in certain circumstances was first definitively addressed 
in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). In Trombetta, the 
defendants had been stopped for suspected drunken driving. Each 
defendant took a breathalyser test and registered higher than .10 
percent, an amount which carries a presumption of intoxication. 
Although feasible, the arresting officers failed to preserve 
samples of the defendants' breath. 
A unanimous Supreme Court declined to find a constitutional 
error in the state's failure to take and preserve samples. The 
Court held that the standard of fundamental fairness required by 
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the Due Process Clause did "not require law enforcement agencies 
[to] preserve [evidence] in order to introduce the results of the 
tests" conducted on such evidence for three reasons. Id. at 941. 
First, the government did not destroy the evidence "in a 
calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements 
established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny"; rather, the 
police officers acted "in good faith and in accord with their 
normal practices." Id. at 488. 
Second, the evidence was not constitutionally material. 
According to the Court, materiality meant evidence which possessed 
"an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was 
destroyed" and was of "such a nature that the defendant would be 
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available 
means." JA^ at 489. On this point, the Court found that other 
methods of challenging the Intoxilyzer test results existed, 
including inspecting the machine and its records and introducing 
evidence of any outside influences, such as chemicals or radio 
waves, that could have affected the test. Id. at 490. 
Finally, the likelihood that the evidence would have been 
exculpatory had it been preserved was small. The Court noted that 
the possibility of error in the breath tests was "extremely low" 
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and found that the breath samples were more likely to be 
inculpatory rather than exculpatory. 
In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), defense counsel 
sought access to an assault kit and clothing to perform blood-group 
tests that might exonerate the defendant of charges of sexual 
assault. Id. at 54. Such tests proved impossible because the 
police had failed to store the samples properly. Id. at 53. 
Youngblood's principle defense was that the victim mistakenly 
identified him as the rapist, and that the semen samples, if 
properly preserved, would have exonerated him. Id. The trial 
court proceeded, but instructed the jury that if it found that the 
state had destroyed or lost evidence, it should infer that the 
evidence would have been favorable to the defendant. Id. at 54. 
The Supreme Court broadened the test articulated in Trombetta, 
by holding that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on 
the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful 
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Id. 
at 58. In so doing, the Court further explained that the mere 
possibility that evidence could exculpate a defendant, had it been 
preserved, would not be sufficient to satisfy the constitutional 
materiality standard articulated in Trombetta. Instead, the 
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exculpatory value of the evidence must be apparent, and this 
apparency must be judged before the evidence is destroyed. 
Therefore, "the presence or absence of bad faith by the police for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the 
police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the 
time it was lost or destroyed." Id. at 56. 
The Supreme Court rejected Youngblood's argument that the 
mishandling of the samples deprived him of his due process rights, 
finding no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the police. The 
Court acknowledged that the likelihood of exoneration was higher 
than in Trombetta, but distinguished Trombetta by observing that 
the state's case in Youngblood did * not rely upon results from 
absent evidence, as was the case in Trombetta.1 The Court found 
that the "apparently exculpatory value" standard set forth in 
Trombetta was not satisfied, because no tests had yet been 
performed, and held that failure to preserve "potentially useful 
evidence" does not constitute a due process violation unless there 
is evidence of bad faith. Id. at 56. In reaching this holding, 
the Court expressed its unwillingness to speculate about the 
possible significance of the destroyed materials and was reluctant 
Youngblood was convicted on the basis of a photographic 
lineup identification. 
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to "impose . . . an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain 
and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable 
evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution." Id. As for 
bad faith, the Court stated that "the presence or absence af bad 
faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must 
necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value 
of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed." Id, at 56-
57. 
The Court determines that the present case more closely 
resembles Ygungfrlppd then Trombetta. In Trombetta, the government 
failed to save breath samples after they had been tested. -In 
Youngblood, similar to the present case, the government failed to 
preserve samples so that definitive tests could not be performed. 
Also, in Trombetta, a subsequent test by the defendant merely 
provided impeachment evidence. On the other hand, in Youngblood, 
as in the present case, a test by the defendant, could it have been 
done, offered a possibility of exoneration. Therefore, the "bad 
faith" standard asserted in Youngblood supplies the controlling Due 
Process standard. 
The "bad faith" standard established in Youngblood was 
recently interpreted by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. 
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Holden, 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Holden, the 
defendant appealed the denial of two motions to suppress, one of 
which was based on the contention that the police acted in bad 
faith when they destroyed nonincriminating evidence from the search 
of the defendant's garbage bags. The defendant in Holden argued 
that the police acted in bad faith by failing to save "potentially 
useful" evidence from the trash because "the burden of preservation 
was minimal" and because the police acted too quickly in disposing 
of the trash without consulting supervisors or written police 
procedures. Id. at 21. 
In discussing the requirement of bad faith set forth in 
Youngblood, the court emphasized that "[b]ad faith requires that a 
defendant must show that *the police . . . by their conduct 
indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the 
defendant.'" Id, at 20 (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). The 
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion "in 
concluding that the police had not acted in bad faith in simply 
doing with the rest of his garbage what Holden intended would be 
done with it, i.e. disposing of it." Id. at 21. 
In this case, the "exculpatory nature" of the destroyed blood 
samples is at best a mere possibility. Under Youngblood, this is 
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not enough to satisfy the constitutional materiality requirement 
articulated in Trombetta. Moreover, there exists no evidence of 
bad faith on the part of Officer Collins. In his Motion, the 
defendant seems to argue that a finding of bad faith is justified 
on the basis that Officer Collins' testimony is at odds with 
Officer Bell's testimony as to whether Officer Collins was informed 
that the blood samples were insufficient and could not be tested. 
The defendant's emphasis on whether Officer Collins discarded the 
blood samples because he thought they were insufficient is 
misplaced. Under Youngblood, the only relevant inquiry to the 
issue of whether Officer Collins acted in bad faith is whether 
Officer Collins knew of the exculpatory value of the blood samples 
at the time that he made the decision to not preserve the blood 
samples for analysis. The apparent miscommunication between the 
officers as to the sufficiency of the blood samples is immaterial 
to this inquiry. 
The Court finds that Officer Collins did not have knowledge of 
the exculpatory value of the blood samples at the time he discarded 
them because the blood had not been tested yet. While the failure 
of Officer Collins to take the blood samples to the State 
Laboratory for testing can at worst be described as negligent, 
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there is no suggestion that Officer Collins discarded the samples 
because he knew that they could form the basis for exonerating the 
defendant. In fact, Officer Collins testified that he did not 
recognize the blood samples as having any evidentiary value one way 
or the other. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion fails to satisfy 
the standards of Youngblood. 
During oral argument, counsel for the defendant argued that 
this case is analogous to State v. Cook, 953 P.2d 712 (Nev. 1998) . 
In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed Cook's conviction 
because the State lost a number of critical pieces of evidence 
including photographs, a report prepared by a detective 
interviewing the defendant, a report of the victim's initial 
statement to police and the victim's sweater. While the court in 
Cook did not apply the Youngblood standard, the court essentially 
found that the police acted in bad faith by losing items that they 
could have "reasonably anticipated to be both material and 
exculpatory." Id. at 715. Cook is clearly distinguishable from 
the present case. Unlike the numerous items lost by the police 
officers in Cook, the blood samples that were discarded in this 
case did not meet the constitutional materiality requirement 
articulated in Trombetta. In addition, the police officers in this 
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case did not act in bad faith and could not have reasonably 
anticipated whether the blood samples would be material and 
exculpatory since the tests on the blood had not yet been 
performed. Accordingly, the Court determines that the defendant's 
reliance on Cook is misplaced. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court denies the 
defendant's Motion. Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order 
consistent with this Memorandum Decision and syfbmit the same to the 
Court for review and signature. 
Dated this .day of September, X998. 
IMOTHY R. HANSON V^JH rt 
ISTRICT COURT VuDGE^/^.? 
VI' 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HOWARD LLOYD MILES, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Case No. 971922700 FS 
Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on State's Destruction of Evidence in the above 
entitled matter came before this Court for hearing on September 18, 1998. Counsel for Defendant, 
Rebecca Hyde, Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, and counsel for the State, Ernest W. Jones, 
Deputy District Attorney, presented their respective positions. Following oral argument the matter 
was taken under advisement to further consider the written submissions. This Court now enters the 
following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The destroyed blood samples, at best, have only a mere possibility of being exculpatory 
in nature. 
2. There exists no evidence of bad faith on the part of Officer Collins. 
3. There was an apparent miscommunication between the officers as to the sufficiency of 
the blood samples. 
4. Officer Collins did not have knowledge of the exculpatory value of the blood samples at 
the time he discarded them because the blood had not yet been tested. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The blood samples that were discarded in this case did not meet the constitutional 
materiality requirement articulated in California v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479 (1984). 
2. The government did not destroy the evidence "in a calculated effort to circumvent the 
disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny"; rather, the police 
officers acted "in good faith and in accord with their normal practices." Trombetta at 488. 
3. The apparent miscommunication between the officers as to the sufficiency of the 
blood samples is immaterial to this inquiry. 
4. The likelihood that the evidence would have been exculpatory had it been preserved 
was small, and therefore the "apparently exculpatory value" standard set forth in Trombetta was 
not satisfied. 
5. Because the present case deals with a government failure to preserve samples so that 
definitive tests could be performed, but does not deal with a failure to preserve samples after they 
have been tested, it more closely resembles Arizona v. Youngblood. 488 U.S. 51 (1988), rather 
than Trombetta. Therefore, the bad faith standard asserted in Youngblood and recently 
interpreted in State v. Holdem 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), supplies the 
controlling Due Process standard. 
6. Because there is no suggestion that Officer Collins discarded the samples because he 
knew that they could form the basis for exonerating the defendant, and because he testified that 
2 
he did not recognize the blood samples as having any evidentiary value at all, the defendant's 
Motion fails to satisfy the "bad faith" standards of Youngblood. 
7. The defendant's reliance on State v. Cook, 953 P.2d 712 (Nev. 1998) is misplaced 
because that case involved numerous items lost by police which they "could reasonably [have] 
anticipated to be both material and exculpatory," whereas this case involves blood samples which 
do not meet the constitutionality requirement set forth in Trombetta. 
8. The destruction of the blood samples did not violate defendants right to Due Process. 
9. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is Denied. 
DATED this 
^ 
day of October. 1998. 
E COURT: 





CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law was hand delivered/mailed postage prepaid on this (J^f\ day of October, 1998 
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Rebecca C. Hyde 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




t THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD LLOYD MILES, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 971922700 FS 
Judge: TIMOTHY R HANSON 
Date: September 25, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: matellew 
Prosecutor: ERNEST W. JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): REBECCA C HYDE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 21, 1964 
Video 
Tape Number: 9:42 am 




1. BURGLARY OF A BUILDING - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/1998 Guilty 
2. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/1998 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY OF A BUILDING a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 971922700 
Date: Sep 25, 1998 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 3 month(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jai. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $2312.50 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. 
Pay fine to THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as'directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Defendant is to pay restitution to Einstein Bagel's in the amount 
of $200. Defendant is to stay away from Einstein Bagels. 
Maintain full-time employment or school. Obtain GED or plumbing 
education. 
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Also, all terms and conditions imposed byJudge Stirba in case 
971021484 are imposed on this case. 
^ d a y of Jjflf- /iSpS. Dated this 
/oKs*-^ JV 
IMOTHY R £MTSON -
 N ^ 
District <£q$jft Judgev \ 
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